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JOINT TENANCY IN REAL PROPERTY-THE
TITLE INSURER'S VIEWPOINT
H. E. TULLY*
Initiative Measure No. 2081 is necessarily brief and does little more
than authorize in Washington "a form of co-ownership of property,
real and personal, known as joint tenancy." In view of the prior his-
tory of joint tenancy with right of survivorship in Washington, so far
as real property is concerned, practically the entire existing local law
on the subject is provided by the initiative measure. This engrafts a
new system of real property ownership onto the existing body of
Washington real property law which has been in the process of de-
velopment for over a century. This article must therefore deal pri-
marily with opinion, or evaluation of alternatives, rather than with
authoritative conclusions. Moreover, even the most general treatment
of a subject as broad as "joint tenancy in real property" is far beyond
the permissible scope of this article and it must follow that the dis-
cussion will be limited to a few specific problems which would appear
to be of general and basic interest.
* Member, Nebraska, Washington and American Bar Associations. Vice President,
Washington Title Insurance Company, Seattle, Washington.
I Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2. "AN ACT Relating to property; authorizing joint
tenancies in real and personal property with common law incidents of survivorship and
severability; allowing property rights of a deceased joint tenant to pass immediately
upon death to the surviving joint tenant; prescribing methods and requirements for the
creation of joint tenancies; providing that the transfer of property to surviving joint
tenants shall not derogate from the rights of creditors; and repealing existing laws
which abolished the right of survivorship as an incident of joint tenancies or tenancy by
the entireties.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
"Section 1. Whereas joint tenancy with right of survivorship permits property to
pass to the survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings, there shall be a
form of co-ownership of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy. A joint
tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common law.
Joint tenancy may be created by written agreement, written transfer, deed, will or
other instrument of conveyance, when expressly declared therein to be a joint tenancy,
or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants: PROVIDED
HOWEVER, That such transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors.
"Section 2. Every interest created in favor of two or more persons in their own right
is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership, for partnership pur-
poses, or unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy, as provided in section 1,
or unless acquired as community property or unless acquired by executors or trustees.
"Section 3. The provisions of this act shall not restrict the creation of a joint tenancy
in a bank deposit or in other choses in action as heretofore or hereafter provided by
law, nor restrict the power of husband and wife to make agreements as provided in
RCW 26.16.120.
"Section 4. Section 1, page 165, Laws of 1885, section 1, chapter 270, Laws of 1953,
and RCW 11.04.070 are each repealed."
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In this discussion it is assumed that in Washington, under the
initiative measure, a common law joint tenancy is authorized except
to the extent that specific provisions of the initiative measure are in-
consistent therewith (as, possibly, the proviso to section 1 that "such
transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors"). It is not of
course entirely clear that this assumption is correct. With respect to
creation of a joint tenancy, for example, the initiative measure pro-
vides that joint tenancy "may be created by written agreement, written
transfer, deed, will or other instrument of conveyance;" and further,
that every interest created in favor of two or more persons in their
own right "is an interest in common, ... unless declared in its creation
to be a joint tenancy...." It may thus be argued that in Washington
the creation of a joint tenancy is merely a matter of clearly expressed
intention and not of compliance with formalistic, common law require-
ments.
CREATION OF A JOINT TENANCY
The "four unities" rule. The "four unities" rule has been expressed
as follows:
In order to constitute a joint tenancy, four requisites must exist, namely:
The tenants must have one and the same interest; the interests must
accrue by one and the same conveyance; they must commence at one and
the same time; and the property must be held by one and the same un-
divided possession. In other words, there must be four unities: (1) unity
of interest, (2) unity of title, (3) unity of time, and (4) unity of posses-
sion. If any one of these elements is lacking, the estate will not be one in
joint tenancy. Hence, where two or more persons acquire an individual
interest in property at different times or by different conveyances, the
estate created is not joint tenancy, for the unity of time or the unity of
conveyance would be disregarded were this to be called a joint tenancy.
2
As indicated, the initiative measure does not in terms prescribe the
"four unities" rule for Washington. Provision is made, however, that
a joint tenancy "shall have the incidents of survivorship and severa-
bility as at common law." Since at common law it is the destruction
of one or more of the four unities that severs and destroys the joint
tenancy,' there is an implication that the four unities must be present
in the creation of a joint tenancy under the Washington law.
Most states still require the four unities to exist if a joint tenancy is
to be created, and virtually all require that the unities continue to
214 Azi. JUR. Cotenancy § 7 (1938).
3 Van Antwerp v. Horan. 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945).
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exist if the joint tenancy is to continue.4 In some jurisdictions, how-
ever, the rule has been modified to eliminate the necessity of the "straw
man" conveyance. This has been accomplished by statute in Cali-
fornia.' In certain other states the same result has been reached by
judicial decision.
In Therrien v. Therrien,8 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
determined the validity and effect of a warranty deed executed by
Marie Louise Therrien to her husband. The granting clause of the
deed included the words "To be held by him with this grantor in joint
tenancy with full rights of ownership vesting in the survivor;" the
habendum clause included the words "to him the said grantee as joint
tenant. ... " The argument advanced in behalf of the heirs of the
grantor was that the deed failed to create a joint tenancy since the
four unities were lacking. Holding that whenever possible the inten-
tion of the grantor will override "purely formalistic objections to real
estate conveyancing based on shadowy, subtle and arbitrary distinc-
tions and niceties of the feudal common law," the court observed:
Adequate support for this constructional rule from respected sources is
not lacking .... "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 187 ...
There remains the more difficult question of the validity of this deed
to create a joint tenancy in the plaintiff and his wife. At common law
such a deed lacks the four-fold unities of interest, title, time and posses-
sion and is ineffective to create a joint tenancy. This rule persists today
in several jurisdictions, although no attempt is made to justify either its
present or past existence. As a result of this doctrine, there has been a
practice of accomplishing the same result by the owner of the property
conveying to a third party (frequently the stenographer or scrivener
writing the deed) who immediately reconveys to the husband and wife as
joint tenants. This circuitous device, incomprehensible to laymen and in
44 THoaPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1777 (repl. 1961).
5 CAL. CIV. CODE, § 683. "A joint interest is one owned by two or more persons in
equal shares, by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in
the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or by transfer from a sole owner to himself
and others, or from tenants in common to themselves, or to themselves and others, or
from a husband and wife when holding title as community property or otherwise to
themselves or to themselves and others when expressly declared in the transfer to be a
joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants. A
joint tenancy in personal property may be created by a written transfer, instrument or
agreement. Provisions of this section shall not restrict the creation of a joint tenancy
in a bank deposit as provided for in the Bank Act."
0 94 N.H. 66, 46 A2d 538 (1946).
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the twentieth century difficult of justification by the legal profession, has
been frequently criticized and rarely praised. The necessity of requiring
an extra deed makes a fetish out of form and compels the parties to the
instrument to employ an indirect manoeuvre of the eighteenth century
merely to satisfy the outmoded unities rule. By judicial decision or
statute a contrary result has been obtained in some jurisdictions.
The prevailing trend of the recent decisions allows the owner of prop-
erty to convey to himself or herself and the other spouse by one deed to
create a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety.
Neither public policy, statutes or reason prevent the parties from doing
directly that which they may accomplish through a straw man indirectly.
The legal effect should be no different in the case where the grantor
becomes a joint grantee than in the instant case where there is a retention
of a part of the title in the grantor. If a conveyance to two completely
divests the grantor's title, a similar grant to one retaining a like interest
in the grantor must, in like manner, divest the grantor of the part
granted. No valid reason appears for denying the right of an owner of
the complete title to create a joint interest with rights of survivorship by
a conveyance of a portion of the title.7
The court concluded that the deed in question created a valid joint
tenancy with right of survivorship in the grantor and grantee. In Iowa
the more liberal rule has also been adopted.'
Illustrative of the opposing line of cases is Deslauriers v. Senesac0
which involved a conveyance of the wife's property executed by her-
self and her husband to themselves, with the recital: "Said grantors
intend and declare that their title shall and does hereby pass to
grantees not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy." Discussing
the effect of the conveyance, the Court stated:
Ida Deslauriers was the sole owner .. . prior to the execution of the deed
from herself and husband to themselves. She could not by that deed con-
vey an interest in the property to herself. ... Hence the interests of Ida
Deslauriers and her husband were neither acquired by one and the same
conveyance, nor did they vest at one and the same time. Two of the
essential properties of a joint estate-the unity of title and the unity of
time-were therefore lacking. Where two or more persons acquire in-
dividual interests in a parcel of property by different conveyances and at
different times, there is neither unity of title nor unity of time, and in such
a situation a tenancy in common, and not a joint tenancy is created ....
Appellee denies that a tenancy in common was created, because, he
argues, the deed expressly stated that the conveyance vas made to the
grantees as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. It was clearly
7 Id. at 66, 46 A.2d at 538-39 (1946).
8 Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946) ; Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa
561, 269 N.W. 259 (1936).
9 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
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the intention of the grantors to convey an estate in joint tenancy. The
intention of the parties to a deed will be given effect, if it can be done
consistently with the rules of law. ... It was not for failure to ascertain
the intention of the grantors that the grantees did not take title in a joint
tenancy, but because, under the law, a joint tenancy could not be created
in the manner which was here attempted. The operation of a deed on the
legal title is not controlled by the intention of the parties, but is governed
by law.10
The court held that the deed conveyed an undivided one-half interest
in the property to the husband and that the wife retained the remain-
ing interest, which upon her death intestate descended to her heirs.
The Therrien and Deslauriers decisions have been treated in some
detail because the question of applicability of the "four unities" rule,
in all its feudal splendor, to creation of joint tenancies in Washington
is of primary importance. While inquiry discloses that relatively few
deeds creating (or purporting to create) joint tenancies have been
recorded since Initiative Measure 208 became effective, it is perhaps
safe to generalize that as many joint tenancy holdings have been and
will be created by conversion from a different form of existing owner-
ship as will be created in the initial acquisition of ownership. Many
such attempts at conversion will probably be defeated if the unities
rule is strictly applied. The rule of the Therrien case is preferable to
the rule of the Deslauriers case from the viewpoint of both private
interest and public interest. Certainly there is little to be said for
adoption of a rule of conveyancing which defeats the clearly expressed
intention of the parties unless that intention is in conflict with express
legislative enactment or is contrary to public policy. It is submitted
that neither public policy nor the provisions of the initiative measure
preclude adoption of the more liberal rule. No legitimate private
interest is served by requiring the preparation and execution of all but
meaningless "straw man" conveyances and no public interest is served
by burdening the recording system with such conveyances.
Nevertheless, until the question has been settled in Washington by
statute or decision, it must be assumed that in appropriate situations
a "straw man" conveyance is necessary to establish the holding of title
under the four unities. Therefore, title insurers in Washington will
for the present be unwilling to insure that a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship has been created unless there has been a full technical
compliance with the four unities rule.
10 Id. at 439, 163 N.E. at 329 (1928).
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Sufficiency of particular language. The initiative measure provides
that joint tenancy may be created by "written agreement, written
transfer, deed, will or other instrument of conveyance, when expressly
declared therein to be a joint tenancy...." Section 2 employs the
phrase "declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy." Thus it is
necessary to consider the sufficiency of particular language as meeting
the requirement of "declaring" the joint tenancy.
Undoubtedly the ideal language to use in a statutory form deed
intended to create a joint tenancy is that which refers specifically to
joint tenancy with right of survivorship and expressly negatives the
creation of a tenancy in common or, in the case of husband and wife,
a community property estate. In the case of grantees who are not
husband and wife, the deed will undoubtedly be sufficient to create a
joint tenancy if the conveyance runs to the grantees "as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common." If the
grantees are husband and wife, the words "and not as a community
property estate" should follow the language quoted in the preceding
sentence. Probably much less in the way of descriptive language will
be held sufficient, e.g., "as joint tenants and not as tenants in common;"
or "as joint tenants with right of survivorship;" or "as joint tenants;"
or "in joint tenancy." However, the descriptive language "declaring"
a joint tenancy which is recommended here is employed as a matter
of course in certain jurisdictions. 1
The title insurance companies in Washington have tentatively con-
cluded that they will not insure that the following descriptive phrases
are sufficient to declare a joint tenancy:
"to A and B, jointly ;"
"to A and B, with right of survivorship ;"
"to A, an undivided one-half interest, and
to B, an undivided one-half interest, as
joint tenants ;,,12
"to A and B, not as tenants in common."
There would appear to be no justification whatever for an attempt to
create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship by conveyance to "A
"A printed form "joint tenancy deed" widely used in Arizona is, in part, as follows:
. . I or we, ....................... do hereby convey to ...................., not as tenants in common
and not as a community property estate, but as joint tenants with right of survivorship,
the following described property...."
12 Because this phraseology is not consistent with the traditional concept that joint
tenants hold "by the half and by the whole," i.e., each owns the entire estate for the
purpose of survivorship but only a particular interest, equal to that of his co-tenant(s),
for the purpose of alienation.
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and/or B" or to "A or B," either with or without additional explana-
tory language.
While a clear and complete expression of intent to create a joint
tenancy is to be recommended, extra verbiage will not necessarily serve
that purpose. For example, a deed running to four persons "as joint
tenants, and to their heirs and assigns, and to the survivors or survivor
of them, and to the heirs and assigns of the survivors or survivor of
them, forever," was construed to create in the grantees a joint tenancy
for life with a contingent remainder in fee simple to the survivor.13
The ultimate result with respect to the survivorship aspect may be the
same as if such conveyance were construed as creating a joint tenancy
in fee, but other aspects (particularly in connection with alienation
and creditors' rights) will be entirely different.
The language declaring the joint tenancy should appear in the
granting clause of a deed rather than as a recital elsewhere in the
deed.1" Many reported decisions involve the question of inconsistency
between the granting and habendum clauses regarding the estate con-
veyed. In general it appears that apt language to create a joint tenancy,
appearing in the granting clause or even as a recital, will control over
the habendum clause which makes no reference to joint tenancy or the
right of survivorship. Obviously, however, when a common law deed
form is used all parts of the deed should be consistent in referring to
joint tenancy with right of survivorship if the grantees are to take an
estate in joint tenancy.
Interests which may be held in joint tenancy.
An estate in joint tenancy may be created in fee, for life, for years, or
even in remainder. Such estate may be created in an equitable title to
property. A joint tenancy may be created by lease. Whatever is subject
to individual dominion by virtue of the law of sole ownership is suscept-
ible of being made the subject of such joint dominion as results from the
law of joint ownership subject to statutory limitations.15
Since Initiative Measure 208 declares that "there shall be a form of
co-ownership of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy"
there is no statutory limitation upon the type of property interests
which may be held in joint tenancy.
13 Jones v. Snyder, 218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922).
14 "Relatively to the granting clause, recitals in a deed stand in much the same posi-
tion as the habendum-that is, the granting clause, if clear and specific, will prevail
over recitals, whether such recitals precede or succeed the granting clause. On the other
hand, such recitals may be resorted to for the purpose of clearing up any obscurity as to
the estate or interest conveyed." 16 AM JuR. Deeds § 241 (1938).
1 4 THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1776, at 14-15 (repl. 1961).
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While unity (or equality) of interest is undoubtedly essential to a
joint tenancy, the interests of the joint tenants need be equal only in
the estate held in joint tenancy, not necessarily in the entire ownership
of the land. Thus, if A conveys Blackacre to H, an undivided one-half
interest, and to H and W, as joint tenants, an undivided one-half in-
terest, the joint tenancy is valid because the interests of H and W are
equal in the half interest held in joint tenancy. 8 Winchester v. Wells17
involves a most interesting question in this general area of discussion."M
COMMUNITY PROPERTY PROBLEMS
One of the most interesting facets of the development of the law of
joint tenancy in Washington will undoubtedly be the reconciliation of
certain principles of joint tenancy ownership with the community
property system. Referring to this problem, the California court com-
mented in Siberell v. Siberell:19
From these statutory provisions it is clear that in California we have a
modified form of certain estates known to the common law and have
them operating alongside of the community property system, an importa-
tion from Spanish law. Naturally, therefore, at times there will appear
to be difficulty in harmonizing these systems. But our statutes have been
amended from time to time, so altering the original provisions of each of
the systems as to allow them both a place in our jurisprudence.
De Funiak observes that, "in sober truth, this grafting by statute of
tenancies of common law origin upon the community property system
is entirely inconsistent with the community property system."
20
'8 it re Estate of Galleto, 75 Cal. App. 2d 580, 171 P.2d 152 (1946) ; OGDEN, CALl-
FoRNrA REAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.5.
17 265 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1959).
18 The case is summarized in 1960 A.B.A. REP., REAL PROPERTY PROBATE AND TRUST
LAW, PART II REAL PROPERTY LAW DrIVsiON, at 85, as follows: "A deed of Florida
land to A, B, C, and D purported to 'give to A and B, his wife, as an estate by entireties,
an undivided one-half interest; to C an undivided one-fourth interest; and to D an undi-
vided one-fourth interest,' providing further for the right of survivorship between the
spouses as to their interest, and among all the grantees as to the whole lot. A and D
died. D's administrator sought partition, alleging that B owned a half interest, C a
one-fourth interest and the estate of D another one-fourth. The court affirmed a
district court denial of partition, relying on an intermediate Florida court decision
construing the 1941 amendment to a Florida antisurvivorship statute as permitting
tenants in common to take by survivorship under a deed expressly so providing. The
opinion implied that it might have reached the same result, if the Florida state court
decision had not been available, by finding a joint tenancy notwithstanding that the
deed gave to the entireties an interest larger than that of either of the two cotenants.
The court said, 'It does not seem essential in all cases that there be an equality of
interest among all grantees in order that a joint tenancy be created.'"
19 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1932).
20 1 DE FuNrIAK, CommuxiTY PROPERTY § 134, at 385 (1943).
[VOL. 37
TITLE INSURER'S VIEWPOINT
The community or separate character of a joint tenancy interest.
In community property states which also permit joint tenancies, the
courts have generally held that property owned by husband and wife
may be held either in joint tenancy or as community property but not
both. In the Siberell case, the court stated:
First, from the very nature of the estate, as between husband and wife,
a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist at the same time in
the same property. The use of community funds to purchase the property
and the taking of title thereto in the name of the spouses as joint tenants
is tantamount to a binding agreement between them that the same shall
not thereafter be held as community property but instead as a joint ten-
ancy with all the characteristics of such an estate. It would be manifestly
inequitable and a subversion of the rights of both husband and wife to
have them in good faith enter into a valid engagement of this character,
and, following the demise of either, to have a contention made that his
or her share in the property was held for the community, thus bringing
into operation the law of descent, administration, rights of creditors, and
other complications which would defeat the right of survivorship, the
chief incident of the law of joint tenancy.
21
In Collier v. Collier,2 involving disposition in a divorce proceeding of
property held in joint tenancy by husband and wife, the Supreme Court
of Arizona held that the interest of a joint tenant in joint tenancy
property is a separate estate.23
Although the Siberell rule was qualified to some extent by two later
decisions,2' the doctrine of that case nevertheless eliminates any pos-
sibility of overlapping of joint tenancy interests and community
property interests in the same property at the same time in California.
Stone v. Marshall" and Section 2 of the initiative measure seem to
uphold the same rule and Washington title insurers have therefore
concluded that for all purposes the interest of each joint tenant in a
22 Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 768, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1932).
2273 Ariz. 450,242 P.2d 537 (1952).
23 In 1937, the Supreme Court of Arizona had held in In re Baldwin's Estate, 50
Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791 (1937), that joint tenancy between husband and wife was
permissible but that such an estate being in derogation of the community property
system, the intention to create the joint tenancy must be clearly expressed. In 1942, in
Henderson v. Henderson, 58 Ariz. 514, 121 P.2d 437 (1942), the same court expressed
doubt that the holding in Baldwin that husband and wife could own as joint tenants was
correct but followed the holding of the earlier case on the basis of stare decisis.24Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944) ; and Delanoy v. Delanoy,
216 Cal. 23, 13 P.2d 513 (1932), holding in substance that evidence is admissible to
establish that husband and wife who took title as joint tenants actually intended it to be
community property or thereafter converted such property to community property
by an oral or written agreement.
2r 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858 (1909).
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properly created joint tenancy holding must be treated as a separate
estate.
Joint tenancy between husband and wife and joint tenancy be-
tween a married person and others. Perhaps the most basic of all
community property concepts under the law of Washington is the
statutory presumption that all property acquired after marriage is
community property, whether title is taken in the name of husband or
wife, unless acquired by gift, devise or descent. The presumption can
be overcome only by clear proof that the consideration given for the
conveyance was money (or other property) which was the separate
property of the spouse in whose name title is taken. Applying this
community property concept to acquisition of real estate in joint
tenancy, a potential problem exists where community funds are used
to purchase real estate, title to which is taken in joint tenancy by
husband and wife (or either husband or wife and one or more persons
other than the spouse). The husband, having management and con-
trol of community personal property (RCW 26.16.030), may clearly
use community funds to purchase real estate but may he direct that
title to the realty be conveyed in such manner as to defeat the wife's
community interest entirely (as when the husband and someone other
than his wife acquire 'title as joint tenants) or to impair the wife's
community interest (as when the title is conveyed to husband and wife,
as joint tenants) by depriving her of her power to dispose of such
interest by will and by depriving her of the protection from claims of
certain classes of creditors which is an incident of ownership of real
estate as community property?2" In this regard, several rules of prac-
26 "As between husband and wife a joint tenancy is an exception to the community
property rule of this state and in derogation of the general policy of that system of
holding property, and this being true a clause in a deed creating a joint tenancy between
them should be effective only where it clearly appears that both spouses have agreed
that the property should be taken in that way.... If the deed itself contains nothing
showing this fact, such, for instance, as an acceptance of the terms thereof in the hand-
writing of the grantees, or an indorsement by the recorder that it was placed of record
at the request of the deceased spouse, it might be established by any proper extrinsic
evidence.
"It must be kept in mind in this connection that community property is frequently
managed by one of the spouses and that it may easily happen that property is purchased
by that spouse with community funds and a deed thereto containing language creating
an estate in joint tenancy delivered to and accepted by him or her without any knowl-
edge of such provision on the part of the other spouse.. . . [W]e think that the party
who relies on a joint tenancy clause in a deed should bear the burden of showing that
the spouse whose property he claims is governed thereby knew that the deed so
provided." In re Baldwin's Estate, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791, 795 (1937).
See also It Re Allen's Estate, 54 Wn.2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959), involving hus-
band's purchase of United States Saving Bonds (beneficiary) with community funds.
Noted in 35 WAsH. L. Rav. 280 (1960).
[VOL. 37
TITLE INSURER'S VIEWPOINT
tice (following the pattern established in other comniiunity property
jurisdictions) are suggested by the title insurers. Tiese-may be ex-
plained and illustrated as follows:
(1) A conveyance by a third person to husband and wife, as joint tenants.
Husband and wife will hold title in a valid joint tenancy, binding on
both, provided both consented to acquisition of title in this manner.
Such consent may in fact have been given by the joinder of both in
execution of earnest money agreement, escrow instructions or other
underlying documents which call for conveyance to them as joint ten-
ants. However, consent in that form will not be established by the
public records and establishment of such consent by testimony or by
production of the underlying document may be difficult or impossible
when the question is raised, perhaps after the lapse of many years.
Accordingly, the purported joint tenancy will not be deemed valid
unless endorsement on the deed by the grantees expressly establishes
the required consent. The endorsement may be in substantially the
following form:
The grantees by signing the acceptance below, evidence their
intention to acquire said premises as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship, and not as community property or as tenants in
common.
Accepted and approved:
(2) A conveyance by a third person to husband and wife and one or
more of their children, as joint tenants. If any such child is married
and the spouse is not a grantee, the spouse should be named as a
grantor and the deed should contain a recital as follows:
Jane Doe, wife of John Doe, grantee herein, joins as grantor in
this deed for the purpose of acknowledging that the considera-
tion paid by her husband for the land herein described is his
separate property and of evidencing her consent to the creation-
of a joint tenancy in the grantees above named.
The spouse so named as grantor should execute and acknowledge the
deed in the same manner as the other grantors. In addition, consent
of the mother and father should be endorsed on the deed as indicated
(and for the reason stated) in (1).
(3) A conveyance by a third person to a married nman (or married
woman) and one or more persons other than the wife (or husband),
as joint tenants. The non-grantee spouse should join in the deed as
grantor and the deed should contain the recital set out in (2).
(4) A conveyance by a third person to a husband and wife and one or
nore other persons, as joint tenants. The husband and wife should
endorse their consent to acquisition of title in this manner, as follows:
i9621
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John Doe and Mary Doe hereby accept the interest herein con-
veyed to them as joint tenants with (other named grantees) ,
and each should sign the endorsement. If the interest of the "one or
more other persons" mentioned in this example also involves a com-
munity property question, it should be eliminated by an appropriate
endorsement, or by joinder, as explained above.
Joinder as grantor by a non-grantee spouse of a joint tenant is recom-
mended because it is believed that a separate deed which purports to
convey the community interest of the non-grantee spouse of a joint
tenant would be unacceptable since it would destroy the required
unities of time and title.
It is doubtful that the required joinder or consent can be executed
on behalf of a principal by an attorney-in-fact when the principal and
attorney-in-fact are spouses, unless the power of attorney specifically
confers authority to do so.
These recommended rules of title practice obviously presuppose a
conveyance which recites the payment of a monetary consideration.
If the acquisition in any of the situations discussed is by means of a
gift deed, no problem of conversion of community assets into a different
type of ownership is presented and acceptance or consent by a grantee
or non-grantee spouse is unnecessary.
If a deed, in all other respects sufficient to create a joint tenancy, is
recorded without the suggested joinder or appropriate endorsed con-
sent, the defect can be cured by a "straw man" conveyance which does
meet the requirements of joinder or endorsed consent, thus eliminating
any problem of outstanding community interest. While such "straw
man" conveyance would be the preferred method of eliminating the
question of outstanding community interest, a later separate recorded
acknowledgment of joint tenancy acquisition would probably suffice.
27
27 A form of consent to be executed and acknowledged by grantee spouses, recom-
mended by the title insurance companies, is as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF JOINT TENANCY ACQUISITION
The undersigned, grantees in that certain deed dated ........................, and recorded
........................ under Auditor's File No ........................., conveying title, in joint tenancy,
to the following described property in ....................... County, Washington:
(insert description)
acknowledge that said conveyance in joint tenancy was made with the consent and
approval of the undersigned; and that it was at the direction of the undersigned
declared in said instrument to be a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, and
that title was not acquired by them as an interest in common and was not acquired as
community property.
Dated this ......... day of ................
A form of acknowledgment or admission of separate character of joint tenancy acqui-
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As indicated, a later conveyance to the purported joint tenants by the
spouse of one would not suffice inasmuch as the "four unities" would
be disturbed.
It must be noted that there can be no certainty that joinder or con-.
sent as discussed above will be required to create a valid joint tenancy,
particularly if the Supreme Court of Washington is disposed to adopt
a strong policy of protection of bona fide purchasers relying on the
record title and to hold that such purchasers need not inquire regarding
the separate or community character of the funds used to acquire title
as in these examples." Accordingly, while title insurers will not insure
the validity of the joint tenancy when community property questions
are not resolved because joinder or consent of record is lacking, neither
will they ignore the purported joint tenancy. Upon death of a pur-
ported joint tenant in this situation, title will be insured only upon the
recording of conveyances which have the effect of merging the claims
or interests of the surviving joint tenant(s) and the persons who would
succeed to the decedent's interest if his ownership thereof were ad-
judged to be a community property holding rather than an interest
held in joint tenancy.
SEVERANCE
In Washington, a joint tenancy "shall have the incidents of sur-
vivorship and severability as at common law."29 But what "common
law" is incorporated by this provision? "No one will contend that the
common law, as it existed in England, has ever been in force in all its
provisions in any State in this Union. It was adopted so far only as its
principles were suited to the conditions of the colonies; and from this
circumstance we see what is common law in one State is not so con-
sition to be executed and acknowledged by a non-grantee spouse, recommended by the
title insurance companies, is as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SEPARATE CHARACTER
OF JOINT TENANCY ACQUISITION
The undersigned, spouse of ........................ , one of the grantees in that certain deed
dated ........................ , and recorded ........................ under Auditor's File No ......................... I
conveying title, in joint tenancy, to the following described property in ........................
County, Washington:
(insert description)
acknowledges and declares that the portion of the purchase price paid by said
grantee was paid with said grantee's separate funds; and the undersigned further
acknowledges and declares that at the date of creation of the joint tenancy interest
in the above described property the undersigned consented to its creation as a valid
joint tenancy in all the grantees named in the deed above described.
D ated this ........................ day of .........................
28 In this connection, see RCW 26.16.095, 100.
20 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, § 1.
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sidered in another.""0 Rules regarding severance of estates held in
joint tenancy have, by judicial decisions, developed differently in dif-
ferent jurisdictions and in many situations which involve a severance
problem, authority on both sides of the question can be produced.
Definition and general statement. Severance of a joint tenancy
has been succinctly defined as follows: "The destruction of any one
of the unities of a joint tenancy. It is so called because the estate is no
longer a joint tenancy but is severed."'" The decision in Re Baker's
Estate" quotes Blackstone on the subject of severance of joint tenancy
in part as follows:
"We are, lastly, to enquire, how an estate in joint-tenancy may be severed
and destroyed. And this may be done by destroying any of its constituent
unifies. 1. That of time, which-respects only the original commencement
-of the joint estate, cannot indeed (being now past) be affected by any
subsequent transactions. But, 2. The joint-tenants' estate may be de-
" stroyed, without any alienation, by merely disuniting their possession.
For joint-tenants being seised "per my et per tout; everything that tends
to narrow that interest, so that they shall not be seised throughout the
whole, and throughout every part, is a severance or destruction of the
jointure. And therefore, if two joint-tenants agree to part their lands,
and hold them in severalty, they are no longer joint-tenants; for they
have now no joint-interest in the whole, but only a several interest re-
spectively in the several parts. And for that reason also, the right of
survivorship is by such separation destroyed. * * * 3. The jointure may
be destroyed, by destroying the unity of title. As if one joint-tenant
alienes and conveys his estate to a third person: here the joint-tenancy
is severed, and turned into tenancy in common; * * * 4. It may be de-
stroyed, by destroying the unity of interest. * * * And, whenever or by
whatever means the jointure ceases or is severed, the right of survivor-
ship or jus accrescendi the same instant ceases with it. ** *,s
There appears to be virtually no dispute among courts regarding the
essential nature or proper definition of severance of a joint tenancy.
The conflict arises when the accepted general principles are applied to
specific acts or occurrences. While one court may hold that a particular
act does in fact destroy one or more of the four unities, another may
hold that the same act does not have that effect. Any discussion at this
time of severance under the Washington law will necessarily be in-
conclusive but a brief consideration of "severance" decisions of appel-
30Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 592 (1834).
31 BLACK, LAw DIcT oNARY 1540 (4th ed. 1951).
32247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863, 865 (1956).
332 BLACKSToNE * 180, 185-86.
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late courts of other states may draw attention to certain doubtful areas
and enable the attorney to advise against any proposed action whih
may sever a joint tenancy holding or, where severance may have inad-
vertently occurred, to restore the joint tenancy by appropriate me.ans
so that the right of survivorship is not unintentionally defeated.
Particular acts or occurrences as effecting a severance. -
Conveyance. It is agreed everywhere that a conveyance of his in-
terest by one joint tenant, whether to a stranger or to 'a co-tenant,
severs the interest conveyed and the grantee holds as a tenant in
common. After a severance has occurred in this manner, reacquisition
of the interest by the grantor will not reinstate the joint tenancy
3 4
But if three or more persons hold as joint tenants, conveyance of 'the
interest of one will not destroy the joint tenancy entirely; the effedt
of the conveyance is merely to sever the interest conveyed. Thus,-Tf
three persons hold as joint tenants, a conveyance by one to a stranger
severs the grantor's interest and his grantee holds an* undivided one-
third interest as a tenant in common, while the other two of the orig-
inal joint tenants hold an undivided two-thirds interest as joint tenaihts.
Even if the conveyance in this 'ituation is'to 'one 'of the other cb-
tenants, the conveyance only severs the interest conveyed.. For ex-
ample, A, B and C are joint tenants. A conveys hisinmterest to B. TfM&f
now vests in B, as tenant in common, an undivided orie-third iiterest,
and in B and C as joint tenants, A undivided two-thirds interest.
3 5' "
Smith v. Smith" involved a conveyance to father and 'son, as joinf
tenants, the deed including this provision: "It is a pirt of the con-
sideration for which this deed is given that neither of 'the parties hereto
shall or can sell, deed, mortgage, or in any way incumber or dispose of-
his interest in said premises or any part thereof without the consent of
the other party in writing." The court held that the restrictive rIa.
graph was repugnant to the grant and an illegal restraint on thedin-
herent right of alienation and therefore void. The writer of thi
annotation following the report of this decision in A-EriIcAN LAW
REPORTS is somewhat critical of the decision and comments as follo ws:
Therefore, as abstractly considered, there is at least some plausibility in
the suggestion that a tenant in common, and particularly a joint tenant,
having a natural continued interest in his cotenant's continued ownership,
34 Scymczak v. Scymczak, 306 Ili. 541, 138 N.E. 218 (1923).
35 OGDEN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.5 (citing Shelton v. Vance, 106
Cal. App. 2d 194, 234 P.2d 1012 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951)).
36 290 Mich. 143,287 N.W. 411 (1939).
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
should be able to enforce a stipulation contained in the conveyance to
them that neither should alien without the consent of the other. The
provision affecting such persons, it may be observed, is not subject to
the objection which arises when a grantor, parting with all interest in
premises, attempts to provide that the same shall not be aliened.
8
T
Contract to convey. A contract by one joint tenant to convey his
interest constitutes a severance." Where the question has arisen, the
courts have divided concerning the effect of a contract for the sale of
joint tenancy property executed by all the joint tenants. In Wisconsin"'
and Kansas"0 it has been held that severance did not result in this
situation. In Iowae1 and Nebraska the opposite view has been taken.
The opinion in the Iowa case suggests that the vendors might continue
to hold their interests in joint tenancy if the contract indicated in some
manner that such was their intention. The principal criticism of the
rule that a contract for the conveyance of joint tenancy property,
executed by all joint tenants, effects a severance is that if the contract
is silent in that regard there is no basis for a presumption or inference
that the parties intended to destroy the right of survivorship in their
remaining interest in the land; and, if destruction of the unities is
deemed controlling, there has been no such destruction since none of
the unities have been disturbed, the interest and rights of each joint
tenant still being equal in every respect.
When all joint tenants execute a contract to sell the joint tenancy
property and intend to hold the vendor's interest in joint tenancy,
that intent will probably be controlling if there is included in the con-
tract an express provision to the effect that the vendors' interest in the
land and their right to payments under the contract are to be held in
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In the absence of such pro-
vision in the contract, title insurers will not insure that full legal title
vests in the surviving joint tenant(s) upon the death of one prior to
conveyance in fulfilment of the contract; title will be insured only
upon the merger of the claims or interests of the surviving joint ten-
ant(s) with the claims or interests of those who would succeed to the
decedent's estate if execution of the contract effected a severance of
the joint tenancy.
- 124 A.L.R. 223 (1940).
38 Kozacik v. Kozacik, 157 Fla. 597, 26 So. 2d 659 (1946) ; Naiburg v. Hendriksen,
370 Ill. 502, 19 N.E.2d 348 (1939).
39 Simon v. Chartier, 250 Wis. 642,27 N.W.2d 752 (1947).
40 Hewitt v. Biege, 183 Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958).
,1 Re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956).
42 Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W2d 252 (1954).
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Mortgage. At common law under the title theory of mortgages, a
mortgage by one joint tenant effected a severance and the joint tenancy
was not restored on release of the mortgage. 3 Generally, in lien theory
states a mortgage by one joint tenant does not sever the joint tenancy,"
but there is authority to the contrary. 5 In Indiana, when one joint
tenant mortgages his interest, the rule appears to be that "to the extent
of the mortgage lien the right of the survivor will be destroyed or sus-
pended, and the equity of redemption, at the death of the tenant, will
be all that will fall to the surviving companion."' 6
At least in lien theory states, there appears to be no decision which
holds that a mortgage of joint tenancy property, executed by both or
all joint tenants, effects a severance of the joint tenancy.
Judgment. The lien created by entry of a judgment against a joint
tenant does not result in severance. Levy made under execution on
the interest of the debtor does not sever the joint tenancy unless under
the law of the particular jurisdiction the levy is made by actual seizure
of the property, resulting in transfer of possession to the sheriff.' Sale
pursuant to the levy of execution prior to death of the judgment debtor
does sever the joint tenancy in most jurisdictions. The effect of redemp-
tion must be regarded as unsettled. In Washington, subject to three
specific exceptions, the purchaser at a sale under execution "from the
day of sale until a resale or redemption . . . shall be entitled to the
possession of the property. .. ."'I The effect of sale under execution is
therefore, in the usual situation, to destroy the unity of possession.
On the other hand, if the judgment debtor redeems, "the effect of the
sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate."' 9 Likewise, the
effect of death of the judgment debtor after sale but prior to expiration
of the period for redemption appears not to be settled.
Partition. It has been held in California that it is not the commence-
ment of an action for partition which causes a severance but only the
judgment in the action which has that effect.50 In Washington, what
43 4 THom-psoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1780 (repl. 1961).
4 People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P2d 858 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
45 "In jurisdictions in which a mortgage ordinarily operates to transfer the legal title,
a mortgage by a joint tenant, which involves such a transfer, will no doubt cause a
severance of the joint tenancy. The same effect has been imputed to a mortgage in at
least one state in which a mortgage does not involve a transfer of the legal title."
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 425, at 210 (3d ed. 1939) (citing Wilken v. Young, 144
Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895)).
4'0 Wilken v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895).
4T Van Anhverp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945).
43 RCW 6.24.210.
40 RCW 6.24.160.
50 Teutenberg v. Schiller, 138 Cal. App. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 53 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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would be the situation if a joint tenant died after entry of judgment of
partition but before sale by the referees or before entry of a decree
confirming the referees' report specifying the portions of the land to
be allotted to each party? This question can be important in connec-
tion with severance since a "judgment of partition while final as
determining the interests of the parties and their rights to partition is
interlocutory as-to the mode of partition, whether in kind or by sale."'"
. Bankruptcy. By operation of law, title to all non-exempt property
of the bankrupt vests in the trustee, when appointed, as of the date of
filing of the petition.52 Thus the bankruptcy of a joint tenant operates
to vest his interest as joint tenant in all non-exempt property in the
bankruptcy trustee 3 and results in severance of the joint tenancy.
Subsequent abandonment by the trustee of the joint tenancy interest
should not .have the effect of reinstating the joint tenancy. Allowance
by the bankruptcy court of a bankrupt joint tenant's interest as exempt
property should not be deemed a severance because title to exempt
property does not pass to the trustee (although the trustee does have
a temporary right of possession of exempt property to enable him to
perform his duty of setting the exemption aside)."
Divorce. "Divorce, in and of itself, does not affect the joint tenancy
of husband and wife."55 Since under the Washington statute' the
court in a divorce action has power to make "such disposition of the
property of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear
just and equitable," there can be no doubt of the court's power to make
specific disposition of joint tenancy property of the parties. If such
property is not disposed of by property settlement agreement or by
the decree of divorce, its status will remain unchanged (since it is as-
sumed that joint tenancy interests are necessarily held as separate
property) unless the court should adopt a rule founded on the theory
that a joint tenancy involving husband and wife was created because of
the special trust and confidence arising from the marital relationship
and when that relationship is terminated by divorce the presumed
intention of the parties would be to eliminate the right of survivorship.
Acts, agreements or contracts inconsistent with continuation of a
joint tenancy. Any act, agreement or contract inconsistent with con-
514 THOmPSoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1822, at 271 (repl. 1961).
52 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
53 Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178 (1942).
54 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 70 (2d ed. 1960).




tinuation of a joint tenancy constitutes a severance but there is difficulty
in determining whether particular acts, agreements or contracts' fall
within this rule. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration, the
following will illustrate possible applications of this rule.
(a) Execution by the joint tenants of a joint will or of mutual wills, dis-
posing of the property or interest held in joint tenancy other than to
the surviving joint tenant should effect a severance. While the mere
execution by one joint tenant of a will which devises his joint ten-
ancy interest in a manner inconsistent with the joint tenancy and
makes other provision for the surviving joint tenant is not technically
a severance, the right of survivorship may be defeated if the will
becomes operative and if the surviving joint tenant elects to take
under the will.
7
(b) A specific agreement to sell joint tenancy property and divide the
proceeds equally effects a severance.
(c) Execution of a partnership agreement .irivolving property held in
joint tenancy may sever the joint tenancy.
(d) Execution of a community property survivorship agreement con-
taining general language indicating an intent that all property of
either spouse, of any nature and however acquired, shall, be held as
community property and shall be subject to operation of the agree-
ment will probably be treated as a conversion of joint tenancy
ownership to community property ownership.
TERMINATION AND SURVIVORSHIP
Proof of termination. The Washington law makes no provision for
establishing of record the fact of death of a joint tenant and the con-
sequent "passage""8 of the decedent's interest to the surviving joint
tenant(s). In California 9 and in a number of other states a "short
form" termination proceeding is required by statute, the obvious pur-
5 See annot. 60 A.L.R.2d 789 (1958).
5 While the title of Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, includes the words "allowing
property rights of a deceased joint tenant to pass immediately upon death to the sur-
viving joint tenant" and further refers to "the transfer of property to surviving joint
tenants," the correct concept of the effect of death of a joint tenant is stated by two
writers as follows: "A joint tenancy estate is a single estate held by two or more per-
sons jointly, such joint tenants holding as though they collectively constituted but one
person, a fictitious entity. When the first joint tenant dies, his individual right to share
enjoyment of the land ceases and the estate continues in the survivor or survivors."
OGDEN, CALIFORNIA R A PRoPETY LAW § 3.1.
"'Survivorship' is the important incident of joint tenancy. The operative effect of
this incident is to free the surviving joint tenant or tenants from the claims or interests
of the deceased joint tenant. The theory is that each joint tenant has total ownership of
the asset in addition to his share interest relevant only in determining inter vivos
relationships. Taking by survivorship then does not amount to an inheritance or even
a transfer at the death of one." Cross, Joint Tenancy for Washingtonu? 35 WAsH.L.Rav.
292,293 (1960).
r1 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1170.
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pose of which is to establish of record the fact of death of the joint
tenant and the clearance of succession tax liability.
The matter of creditor's rights creates a further problem in connec-
tion with termination of a joint tenancy since the Washington law is
apparently unique in its treatment of creditors of a joint tenant.
Section 1 of the act provides that "such transfer shall not derogate
from the rights of creditors." Whether the transfer referred to in this
proviso means the original transfer of title to the joint tenants or the
"transfer" of title to the surviving joint tenant(s) occurring at the
death of one joint tenant (see the title of the act, which refers to the
transfer of property to surviving joint tenants) has already provoked
much discussion. Almost identical language protecting creditors ap-
pears in RCW 26.16.120, authorizing community property survivor-
ship agreements, and it has been assumed for years by title insurers,
and apparently by the bar, that this provision enabled creditors of a
deceased spouse to reach a decedent's interest in community property
subject to such agreement to the same extent as other assets of the
decedent's estate. It would not appear to be an unwarranted inference,
in view of the similarity of the language chosen and the similarity in
effect of a community property survovorship agreement and a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship, that the initiative measure was
intended to allow creditors identical rights with respect to each of
these survivorship devices. While recognizing that a question of inter-
pretation exists, title insurers will insure title in a surviving joint ten-
ant without exception of rights of creditors of the decedent (and
without exception of funeral expenses and other indebtedness incurred
after death but attributable to the decedent) only on the furnishing of
proof satisfactory to the insurer that all debts have been paid or that
adequate provision for payment has been made.
In some instances the estate of a deceased joint tenant will be pro-
bated because the estate includes assets of substantial value which are
not held in joint tenancy. In those cases, joint tenancy property will
no doubt be included in the inventory for the limited purpose of deter-
ruination of succession tax liability. The probate proceeding will of
course establish of record the fact of death of the joint tenant and the
claims of creditors will be paid or barred as in other cases, so that all
questions related to termination of the joint tenancy are resolved of
record.
In cases in which a deceased joint tenant's estate will not be probated,
clearance of inheritance tax pursuant to the provisions of RCW 83.24
[VCOL. 37
TITLE INSURER'S VIEWPOINT
will normally be required. Waiver of this requirement by title insurers
will undoubtedly be limited to the relatively few cases in which even
the most cursory inquiry clearly establishes that the value of the de-
cedent's estate (including the entire value of all joint tenancy property)
is so small as to be within the exemptions allowed by the inheritance
tax statutes.
Section 1 of the initiative measure recites that "joint tenancy with
right of survivorship permits property to pass to the survivor without
the cost or delay of probate proceedings," and quite clearly the pro-
ponents of the measure hoped to avoid the expense and delay of any
formal termination proceeding in connection with joint tenancies. Pro-
posal of even a simplified and relatively inexpensive termination pro-
ceeding would therefore probably not be met with public (or legislative)
favor. Nevertheless, even the most grudging recognition that
"marketability of title" retains a place in our system of real property
law will indicate the need of some form of record proof of termination
of a joint tenancy holding by death.
In the absence of statutory provision for a prescribed termination
proceeding it is expected that the courts of Washington will sanction
the use of affidavits to complete the record of title to real property
when ownership is affected by death of a joint tenant whose estate is
not probated. Accordingly, before insuring title in a surviving joint
tenant, title insurers will require the recording of an affidavit executed
by the survivor (or other person familiar with the decedent's affairs),
to which is attached a certified copy of certificate of death of the de-
ceased joint tenant. The affidavit should 1) establish that the decedent
named in the death certificate is identical with the joint tenant whose
interest is allegedly terminated by death; 2) impart information re-
garding succession tax liability and probate proceedings which might
affect the interest of the deceased joint tenant; 3) impart any pertinent
information regarding acts or occurrences not disclosed by the public
records but possibly effecting a severance of the joint tenancy before
the death of any joint tenant; 4) include an affirmative representation
regarding payment of all debts of the deceased joint tenant; and 5)
include a direct agreement to indemnify against loss arising by reason
of misrepresentation of fact.
Survivorship. Under certain circumstances the right of survivorship
will be defeated even though the joint tenancy is terminated by death
of a joint tenant and not by severance prior to death.
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One such circumstance is the wilful and unlawful killing of one joint
tenant by another. RCW 11.84.020 provides that no slayer "shall in
any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of
the death of the decedent." RCW 11.84.050 provides for the disposi-
tion of property in which the slayer and decedent held joint tenancy
interests. RCW 11.84.120 affords some protection to purchasers
(mortgagees are not mentioned) from the slayer for value and without
notice.
In the case of simultaneous death of joint tenants, RCW 11.05.030
makes provision for disposition of the joint tenancy property. If two
joint tenants owning the entire property die simultaneously, the prop-
erty "shall be distributed one-half as if one had survived and one-half
as if the other had survived." If there are more than two joint tenants
and all have died simultaneously, "the property thus distributed shall
be in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of joint
tenants."
The status of title to joint tenancy property when a joint tenant is
an absentee within the contemplation of RCW 11.80 is a subject open
to almost endless speculation. The final distribution of the absentee's
estate at the end of the period specified by the statute" is not tanta-
mount to a determination that death has occurred. Even if it were,
the actual date of death would be of primary importance in disposing
of questions of severance and survivorship in connection with joint
tenancy property. The relatively few Washington cases dealing with
presumption of death arising from absence are of little assistance in
this context.
Finally, mention has been made elsewhere in this article of the
possibility that the right of survivorship may be defeated, even in the
absence of severance, in the event of disposition of a joint tenant's
interest by will and election by the surviving joint tenant to take
benefits under the will.
CONCLUSION
The writer has observed no attitude of prejudice against the principle
of joint tenancy ownership on the part of representatives of title in-
surance companies in this state or elsewhere. In many other states,
ownership of real property in joint tenancy has proved desirable from
the point of view of landowners (at least when used with discrimina-




states has presented no insuperable problems in the area of title insur-
ance and none should arise in Washington if the courts and the bar of
the state will develop and observe rules and practices which will lead
to reasonable certainty in dealing with joint tenancy titles. In this
regard, it should make little difference whether the Supreme Court of
Washington adopts a "liberal" or "conservative" attitude toward joint
tenancy-once the Court's approach is known and a few basic rules are
established, attorneys and title insurers can surely reach reasonably
firm conclusions in dealing with joint tenancy titles. Until some degree
of certainty in the law of joint tenancy in Washington is developed,
however, this admonition appears to be appropriate:
joint tenancy, then, may be like marriage-a relationship not to be rushed
into, or entered upon lightly, but soberly and deliberately, and in fear of
taxes and future interpretations by our Supreme Court.0'
61 From a pamphlet entitled Joint Tenancies in Arizona, written by Rhes H. Cor-
nelius, member of the Arizona Bar and an officer of Phoenix Title & Trust Company.
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